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Abstract: Isolated and easily protectable IT systems have developed into fragile and complex
structures over the past years. These systems host manifold, flexible and highly connected applications,
mainly in virtual environments. To ensure protection of those infrastructures, Security Incident and
Event Management (SIEM) systems have been deployed. Such systems, however, suffer from many
shortcomings such as lack of mechanisms for forensic readiness. In this extended abstract, we identify
these shortcomings and propose an architecture which addresses them. It is developed within the
DINGfest project for which we seek feedback from the community.
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1 Motivation and Problem Statement
During the last few years, IT infrastructures have evolved to heterogeneous and complex
structures which are becoming increasingly harder to control and protect. To reduce
the complexity of securing those systems, companies have integrated centralized and
holistic protection and incident management measures like Security Information and
Event Management (SIEM) systems [Sh16]. SIEM systems mainly cover log collection,
normalization, analyses, storage and monitoring [Mi11]. However, today’s SIEM systems
comewith a lot of deficiencies whichwe address in theDINGfest (DetektIon, VisualisieruNG,
ForEnsische Aufbereitung von SicherheiTsvorfällen) project for which we seek feedback
from the community.
First, SIEM systems are quite expensive and proprietary. In DINGfest, we plan to show that
it is possible to build an effective SIEM system based on open source software. This lowers
the barriers for practical usage, especially for small and medium-sized businesses. Second,
common SIEM systems are not prepared for forensic analysis, which is required if a legal
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dispute is expected. To improve the trustworthy collection of evidence, data is acquired
via Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) and the integrity of extracted data is protected to
support a clean chain of custody. Third, DINGfest has built-in common forensic tools for an
extensive and fast forensic investigation and will be able to normalize gathered evidences
and report incidents to third parties, e.g., the German Federal Office for Information Security.
In addition to common SIEM systems, we use further data sources for analysis, e.g., from
an Identity and Access Management (IAM) system. Furthermore, users spend an extensive
amount of time to configure detection heuristics of SIEM systems. In DINGfest we provide
Visual Security Analytics that aim to combine automated analysis with domain knowledge
of security experts. In the following we introduce the more general DINGfest architecture to
overcome these shortcomings.
2 Conceptual Architecture
The DINGfest architecture consists of three main components (see Fig. 1).Data Acquisition
collects data in real time from various sources. Data Stream represents the central data
hub used by the subsequent component to query data, which is implemented using Apache
Kafka. Data Analysis leverages event processing and identity behavior analytics (IBA) for
automated incident detection. Additionally visual security analytics for integrating expert
knowledge is incorporated. Finally, Digital Forensics & Incident Reporting transforms
identified incidents into a structured format and reports them. The main components of the
proposed architecture are currently under active development in the ongoing project.
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Fig. 1: DINGfest conceptual architecture and data flow
Data Acquisition: Virtual machine introspection (VMI) allows the acquisition of an
untampered view on the system state from the outside without using an in-guest agent. Due
to the strong isolation between the monitoring system and the monitored system, VMI is a
valuable method for intrusion detection systems as well as for forensic analysis [Ja14]. Since
VMI is resource intensive, we only gather a limited amount of information for intrusion
detection. In the proposed architecture, we use VMI to periodically extract information
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such as the process list of a monitored VM and trace system and function calls. In case of
an incident, we collect additional information for forensic analysis. Besides that, we feed
all system logs into the DINGfest data stream using the log collection module. Our VMI
component is based on the libvmi library and supports the Xen hypervisor.
Data Analysis: The analysis within DINGfest is divided into different modules namely
an event processing module, an identity behavior analytics module and a visual security
analytics module. DINGfest’s event processing module monitors the data stream, which
consists of different sources like log data or system call traces. It recognizes the occurrence
of pre-defined events using an event fingerprint database. Thereby, not only malicious events
are detected but also benign ones. Afterwards, these events are passed to the following
modules for further processing. To extend the event database, new fingerprints are computed
based on the multiple execution of pre-defined events.
If data is generated via user actions (e.g. in applications) an additional identity behavior
analytics (IBA) module can be applied. The term IBA was developed during the work
of DINGfest and is based on the field of behavior analysis [SSW16]. Within this module,
suspicious data packets can be identified based on the usage behavior of the underlying
user permissions. Traditionally, IAM systems can be found in medium to large-sized
organizations containing various information about users as well as their permissions and
other attributes (e.g. department) [Hu16]. This data can be exploited for further analysis in
the IBA module. Therefore, DINGfest maps data packets to an identity and its corresponding
permission set. Thus, the module can compare the current behavior of users and their
permissions with already known behavior (e.g. based on peer-group or history analysis).
The visual security analytics module combines automated analyses with interactive
visualizations for an effective reasoning on large and complex data sets [Ke08]. In DINGfest,
visual analytics is applied to include the domain knowledge of security experts into the
analysis processes. Therefore, the two main analysis steps (event processing and identity
behavior analytics) have to be supported by interactive knowledge-assisted visual interfaces.
A central challenge here is to identify appropriate visual metaphors which allow appropriate
conversion of knowledge between human and machine. This enables the continuous
integration of expert knowledge and improves the detection rate of automated incident
detection. Besides the support of the two analysis steps, DINGfest also provides an interface
to visualize detected security incidents. This improves awareness for experts on the security
situation, generates trust in the automated detection mechanisms, and allows to understand
the incident. These components are based on open-source technologies (Angular 5, D3.js).
Digital Forensics & Incident Reporting: This component is responsible for preserving
evidence that has been detected by the DINGfest analysis and to prepare this data to be
reported to governmental institutions. The detected data is converted into Indicators of
Compromise (IoC), which represent indications for incidents in a structured manner. These
are stored into a graph database (IoC vault) which serves as information source for the
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modules forensic analysis and incident reporting.
DINGfest’s forensic analysis comes with an event fingerprint database which stores a
large number of malicious and benign event fingerprints (as described above). Since only
unique patterns are part of a fingerprint, the detection of a specific event can be considered
as “forensically clean”. To support the process of a chain of custody, extracted data is
signed and hashed with the corresponding timestamp. For more elaborate forensic analysis,
the hypervisor is extended with forensic tools. That allows the use of classic open source
forensic analysis software.
The incident reporting module is responsible for reporting detected threats, attacks,
and vulnerabilities. As soon as new incidents are identified and all relevant information
is preserved by the forensics module. The information will be unified and transferred
into a structured reporting format. It provides reporting capabilities for incident data to
governmental institutions being compliant with applicable laws and directives such as the
General Data Protection Regulation. Additionally, it enables the exchange of data within a
cyber threat intelligence community, to quickly inform all participants about approaching
threats. The module also provides pseudonymization capabilities to protect the reporting
company’s identity. In addition, procedures to create incentives for the exchange of threat
information are researched and developed to increase the acceptance amongst companies.
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